Kerberos, OSF/DCE, and Public Key

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Problem

Alice sends a message to Bob.

> How does Bob know it came from Alice, and it hasn't been modified en route?

Bob needs *identification*, *authentication*, *integrity*.

Applications: Login, database access, printing, network management, ...

Solutions

Passwords

Alice, Bob authenticate with a shared password.

Mediation

Alice, Bob authenticate with a shared session key issued by key center.

Public keys

Alice, Bob authenticate with digital signatures.

Passwords

Alice, Bob share a password K_{AB}.

They authenticate each other by encrypting, for example, a time stamp under the password:

Alice $\rightarrow$ Bob: A, K_{AB}(time)

Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice: K_{AB}(time+1)

If they also exchange a secret key under the password, they can authenticate (and encrypt) subsequent messages without the password.

Passwords (cont'd)

Good speed, but poor scalability; two copies/secret, many secrets/user.

Mediation

Alice shares a secret key K_{AC} with key center; Bob shares a secret key K_{BC}.

Alice, Bob authenticate each other with a session key issued by the key center.

For example, Alice authenticates to the key center with K_{AC}, and the key center returns two encrypted copies of the session key:

$$\langle K_{AC}(K_{session}), K_{BC}(K_{session}) \rangle.$$

Mediation (cont'd)

Alice sends Bob his copy, and they authenticate each other with the session key:

Alice $\rightarrow$ Bob: A, $K_{BC}(K_{session})$, $K_{session}(time)$

Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice: $K_{session}(time+1)$

Alice and Bob can authenticate (and encrypt) subsequent messages with the session key.

Good speed, fair scalability; two copies/secret, one secret/user; key center trusted with secrets.

Kerberos

Mediated solution—Needham & Schroeder, 1978; MIT, 1986.

Participants

Users

Servers

Kerberos server

Ticket-granting server (TGS)

Keys

User, Kerberos server share a secret key.

Kerberos server, TGS share a secret key.

Server, TGS share a secret key.

Kerberos (cont'd)

At login

User authenticates to Kerberos server with shared secret to get a *ticket* to TGS and encrypted session key.

Ticket contains user's name, time, encrypted under TGS secret key.

For each service

1. User authenticates to TGS with TGS ticket, session key to get server ticket, encrypted session key.
2. User authenticates to server with server ticket, session key.

Kerberos (cont'd)

What about scalability?

TGS shares secret keys with servers.

For Alice to authenticate to another server requires
TGS to share a secret key with that server

... or with another TGS.

Suppose Alice sends a message to Robert (a server)
in France.

If Alice's local TGS shares a secret key with
Robert's TGS, then Alice can get a ticket to
Robert's TGS, and therefore to Robert.

Robert authenticates Alice with the ticket.

Kerberos (cont'd)

What about scalability? (cont'd)

TGS's must trust each other with secret keys.

TGS trust hierarchy simplifies administration.

Future versions of Kerberos may include TGS-to-TGS authentication with public keys.

In such versions, TGS's need not trust each other with secret keys, just certification authorities with public keys.

DCE

Distributed Computing Environment—another mediated secret-key solution—HP, OSF, 1990s.

"Commercializable" Kerberos v5 with new tools.

Participants, keys, protocols as in Kerberos, with extensions such as access control lists; support for directory names.

Public-key versions planned, as part of Sesame effort.

Public keys

Alice has public key R_A, private key S_A; Bob has public key R_B, private key S_B.

They also have certificates $S_C(\langle \text{user}, R_{\text{user}} \rangle)$, where S_C is certification authority's private key.

Alice and Bob authenticate each other by encrypting, for example, a time stamp under their private keys:

Alice $\rightarrow$ Bob: $S_C(\langle A, R_A \rangle)$, $S_A(\text{time})$

Bob $\rightarrow$ Alice: $S_C(\langle B, R_B \rangle)$, $S_B(\text{time})$

Public keys (cont'd)

If they also exchange a secret key under one of their public keys, they can authenticate (and encrypt) subsequent messages.

Fair speed, good scalability; one copy/secret, one secret/user; certification authorities trusted with public keys.

But good speed in hybrid with secret key.

NetWare

A public-key solution—Novell, 1993.

Participants

Users

Servers

Certification authority

Keys

Users have public/private key pairs.

Servers have public/private key pairs.

Certification authority issues certificates to users, servers.

NetWare (cont'd)

At login

User authenticates to login server with key pair, generates a short-term key pair.

For each service

User authenticates to server with short-term key pair; includes long-term and short-term certificates.

If user, server exchange a secret key, they can authenticate (and encrypt) subsequent messages.

(Actual implementation is more efficient; has zero-knowledge proofs, avoids short-term certificate.)

NetWare (cont'd)

What about scalability?

Alice can authenticate to any server that trusts Alice's certification authority.

No administration of secret keys.

Certification hierarchy simplifies administration of public keys.

TGS must trust certification authorities with public keys.

SPX

Another public-key solution—Tardo, Alagappan & Pitkin, Digital, 1989.

Protocols as in Kerberos, with certification authority, not Kerberos server/TGS.

Compatible with Generic Security Service API.

As in NetWare, but RSA session keys, rather than zero-knowledge proofs.

X.509/Privacy-Enhanced Mail certificates.

Conclusions

Problem

How does Bob know it's from Alice?

Solutions

Passwords, mediation, public key

	passwords	**mediation**	**public key**
speed	good	good	fair*
scalability	poor	fair	good
copies/secret	two	two	one
secrets/user	many	one	one

*Good if ongoing authentication with secret key.

Conclusions (cont'd)

Systems

Kerberos, OSF/DCE, NetWare, SPX

Speed vs. scalability

Secret key for speed, public key for scalability

Hybrid solutions achieve both