wdiff rfc5320.original rfc5320.txt

Network Working Group F. Templin, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 5320 Boeing Phantom Works
Intended status:
Category: Informational August 19, October 2008
Expires: February 20, 2009

The Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL)
draft-templin-seal-23.txt

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Abstract

For the purpose of this document, subnetworks are defined as virtual
topologies that span connected network regions bounded by
encapsulated
encapsulating border nodes. These virtual topologies may span
multiple IP- IP and/or sub-IP layer forwarding hops, and can introduce
failure modes due to packet duplication and/or links with diverse
Maximum Transmission Units (MTUs). This document specifies a
Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation Layer (SEAL) that
accommodates such virtual topologies over diverse underlying link
technologies.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ....................................................3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 .................................................3
1.2. Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ...................................................5
2. Terminology and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ....................................5
3. Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .........................................6
4. SEAL Protocol Specification - Tunnel Mode . . . . . . . . . . 7 .......................7
4.1. Model of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .........................................7
4.2. ITE Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ..........................................9
4.2.1. Tunnel Interface MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ................................9
4.2.2. Accounting for Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 .............................10
4.2.3. Segmentation and Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 .....................11
4.2.4. Sending Probes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 .....................................13
4.2.5. Packet Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ..............................14
4.2.6. Sending SEAL Protocol Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 ......................14
4.2.7. Processing Raw ICMPv4 Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 .....................14
4.2.8. Processing SEAL-Encapsulated ICMPv4 Messages . . . . . 15 .......15
4.3. ETE Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 .........................................16
4.3.1. Reassembly Buffer Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 .....................16
4.3.2. IPv4-Layer Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 ..............................16
4.3.3. Generating SEAL-Encapsulated ICMPv4
Fragmentation Needed Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 ...............................17
4.3.4. SEAL-Layer Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 ..............................18
4.3.5. Delivering Packets to Upper Layers . . . . . . . . . . 18 .................19
5. SEAL Protocol Specification - Transport Mode . . . . . . . . . 19 ...................19
6. Link Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 ..............................................20
7. End System Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ........................................20
8. Router Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ............................................20
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ............................................21
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 .......................................21
11. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ..................................................21
12. SEAL Advantages over Classical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ........................22
13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 ...............................................23
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 ....................................................23
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 .....................................23
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 ...................................24
Appendix A. Historic Evolution of PMTUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 ...........................26
Appendix B. Reliability Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 28 ................................27

1. Introduction

As Internet technology and communication has grown and matured, many
techniques have developed that use virtual topologies (frequently
tunnels of one form or another) over an actual network that suppors supports
the Internet Protocol (IP) [RFC0791][RFC2460]. Those virtual
topologies have elements which that appear as one hop in the virtual
topology, but are actually multiple IP or sub-IP layer hops. These
multiple hops often have quite diverse properties which that are often not
even visible to the end-points endpoints of the virtual hop. This introduces
many
failure modes that are not dealt with well in current approaches.

The use of IP encapsulation has long been considered as the means for
creating such virtual topologies. However, the insertion of an outer
IP header reduces the effective path MTU as-seen by the IP layer.
When IPv4 is used, this reduced MTU can be accommodated through the
use of IPv4 fragmentation, but unmitigated in-the-network
fragmentation has been found to be harmful through operational
experience and studies conducted over the course of many years
[FRAG][FOLK][RFC4963]. Additionally, classical path MTU discovery
[RFC1191] has known operational issues that are exacerbated by in-
the-network tunnels [RFC2923][RFC4459]. In the following
subsections, we present further details on the motivation and
approach for addressing these issues.

1.1. Motivation

Before discussing the approach, it is necessary to first understand
the problems. In both the Internet and private-use networks today,
IPv4 is ubiquitously deployed as the Layer 3 protocol. The two
primary functions of IPv4 are to provide for 1) addressing, and 2) a
fragmentation and reassembly capability used to accommodate links
with diverse MTUs. While it is well known that the addressing
properties of IPv4 are limited (hence (hence, the larger address space
provided by IPv6), there is a lesser-known but growing consensus that
other limitations may be unable to sustain continued growth.

First, the IPv4 header Identification field is only 16 bits in
length, meaning that at most 2^16 packets pertaining to the same
(source, destination, protocol, Identification)-tuple may be active
in the Internet at a given time. Due to the escalating deployment of
high-speed links (e.g., 1Gbps Ethernet), however, this number may
soon become too small by several orders of magnitude. Furthermore,
there are many well-known limitations pertaining to IPv4
fragmentation and reassembly - -- even to the point that it has been
deemed "harmful" in both classic and modern-day studies (cited
above). In particular, IPv4 fragmentation raises issues ranging from
minor annoyances (e.g., slow-path processing in routers) to the
potential for major integrity issues (e.g., mis-association of the
fragments of multiple IP packets during reassembly).

As a result of these perceived limitations, a fragmentation-avoiding
technique for discovering the MTU of the forward path from a source
to a destination node was devised through the deliberations of the
Path MTU Discovery Working Group (PMTUDWG) during the late 1980's
through early 1990's (see: (see Appendix A). In this method, the source
node provides explicit instructions to routers in the path to discard
the packet and return an ICMP error message if an MTU restriction is
encountered. However, this approach has several serious shortcomings
that lead to an overall "brittleness".

In particular, site border routers in the Internet are being
configured more and more
being configured to discard ICMP error messages coming from
the outside world. This is due in large part to the fact that
malicious spoofing of error messages in the Internet is made simple
since there is no way to authenticate the source of the messages.
Furthermore, when a source node that requires ICMP error message
feedback when a
packets packet is dropped due to an MTU restriction does not
receive the messages, a path MTU-related black hole occurs. This
means that the source will continue to send packets that are too
large and never receive an indication from the network that they are
being discarded.

The issues with both IPv4 fragmentation and this "classical" method
of path MTU discovery are exacerbated further when IP-in-IP tunneling
is used. For example, site border routers that are configured as
ingress tunnel endpoints may be required to forward packets into the
subnetwork on behalf of hundreds, thousands, or even more original
sources located within the site. If IPv4 fragmentation were used,
this would quickly wrap the 16-bit Identification field and could
lead to undetected data corruption. If "classical" IPv4
fragmentation were used instead, the site border router may be
bombarded by ICMP error messages coming from the subnetwork which that may
be either untrustworthy or insufficiently provisioned to allow
translation into error message to be returned to the original
sources.

The situation is exacerbated further still by IPsec tunnels, since
only the first IPv4 fragment of a fragmented packet contains the
transport protocol selectors (e.g., the source and destination ports)
required for identifying the correct security association rendering
fragmentation useless under certain circumstances. Even worse, there
may be no way for a site border router the that configures an IPsec
tunnel to transcribe the encrypted packet fragment contained in an
ICMP error message into a suitable ICMP error message to return to
the original source. Due to these many limitations, a new approach
to accommodate links with diverse MTUs is necessary.

1.2. Approach

For the purpose of this document, subnetworks are defined as virtual
topologies that span connected network regions bounded by
encapsulating border nodes. Examples include the global Internet
interdomain routing core, Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) and some
enterprise networks. Subnetwork border nodes forward unicast and
multicast IP packets over the virtual topology across multiple IP- IP
and/or sub-IP layer forwarding hops which that may introduce packet
duplication and/or traverse links with diverse Maximum Transmission
Units (MTUs)

This document introduces a Subnetwork Encapsulation and Adaptation
Layer (SEAL) for tunnel-mode operation of IP over subnetworks that
connect the Ingress- Ingress and Egress Tunnel Endpoints (ITEs/ETEs) of border
nodes. Operation in transport mode is also supported when subnetwork
border node upper-layer protocols negotiate the use of SEAL during
connection establishment. SEAL accommodates links with diverse MTUs
and supports efficient duplicate packet detection by introducing a
minimal mid-layer encapsulation.

The SEAL encapsulation introduces an extended Identification field
for packet identification and a mid-layer segmentation and reassembly
capability that allows simplified cutting and pasting of packets.
Moreover, SEAL senses in-the-network IPv4 fragmentation as a "noise"
indication that packet sizing parameters are "out of tune" with
respect to the network path. Instead of experiencing this
fragmentation as As a disasterous event, however, result, SEAL can naturally tunes tune
its packet sizing parameters to eliminate the in-the-network
fragmentation and thereby squelch the noise.
fragmentation.

The SEAL encapsulation layer and protocol is are specified in the
following sections.

2. Terminology and Requirements

The terms "inner", "mid-layer" "mid-layer", and "outer" respectively "outer", respectively, refer to
the innermost IP {layer, (layer, protocol, header, packet, etc.} etc.) before any
encapsulation, the mid-layer IP {protocol, (protocol, header, packet, etc.)
after any mid-layer '*' encapsulation encapsulation, and the outermost IP {layer, (layer,
protocol, header, packet etc.} etc.) after SEAL/*/IPv4 encapsulation.

The term "IP" used throughout the document refers to either Internet
Protocol version (IPv4 or IPv6). Additionally, the notation IPvX/*/
SEAL/*/IPvY
IPvX/*/SEAL/*/IPvY refers to an inner IPvX packet encapsulated in any mid-
layer
mid-layer '*' encapsulations encapsulations, followed by the SEAL header header, followed
by any outer '*' encapsulations encapsulations, followed by an outer IPvY header,
where the notation "IPvX" means either IP protocol version (IPv4 or
IPv6).

The following abbreviations correspond to terms used within this
document and elsewhere in common Internetworking nomenclature:

ITE - Ingress Tunnel Endpoint

ETE - Egress Tunnel Endpoint

PTB - an ICMPv6 "Packet Too Big" or an ICMPv4 "Fragmentation
Needed" message

DF - the IPv4 header "Don't Fragment" flag

MHLEN - the length of any mid-layer '*' headers and trailers

OHLEN - the length of the outer encapsulating SEAL/*/IPv4 headers

S_MRU-

HLEN - the sum of MHLEN and OHLEN

S_MRU - the per-ETE SEAL Maximum Reassembly Unit

S_MSS - the SEAL Maximum Segment Size

SEAL_ID - a 32-bit Identification value; value, randomly initialized and
monotonically incremented for each SEAL protocol packet

SEAL_PROTO - an IPv4 protocol number used for SEAL

SEAL_PORT - a TCP/UDP service port number used for SEAL

SEAL_OPTION - a TCP option number used for (transport-mode) SEAL

The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Applicability Statement

SEAL was motivated by the specific case of subnetwork abstraction for
Mobile Ad-hoc Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), however (MANETs); however, the domain of applicability
also extends to subnetwork abstractions of enterprise networks, the
interdomain routing core, etc. The domain of application therefore
also includes the map-and-encaps architecture proposals in the IRTF
Routing Research Group (RRG) (see: (see http://www3.tools.ietf.org/group/
irtf/trac/wiki/RoutingResearchGroup).

SEAL introduces a minimal new sublayer for IPvX in IPvY encapsulation
(e.g., as IPv6/SEAL/IPv4), and appears as a subnetwork encapsulation
as seen by the inner IP layer. SEAL can also be used as a sublayer
for encapsulating inner IP packets within outer UDP/IPv4 header headers
(e.g., as IPv6/SEAL/UDP/IPv4) such as for the Teredo domain of
applicability [RFC4380]. When it appears immediately after the outer
IPv4 header, the SEAL header is processed exactly as for IPv6
extension headers.

SEAL can also be used in "transport-mode", e.g., when the inner layer
includes upper layer upper-layer protocol data rather than an encapsulated IP
packet. For instance, TCP peers can negotiate the use of SEAL for
the carriage of protocol data encapsulated as TCP/SEAL/IPv4. In this
sense, the "subnetwork" becomes the entire end-to-end path between
the TCP peers and may potentially span the entire Internet.

The current document version is specific to the use of IPv4 as the
outer encapsulation layer, however layer; however, the same principles apply when
IPv6 is used as the outer layer.

4. SEAL Protocol Specification - Tunnel Mode

4.1. Model of Operation

SEAL supports the encapsulation of inner IP packets in mid-layer and
outer encapsulating headers/trailers. For example, an inner IPv6
packet would appear as IPv6/*/SEAL/*/IPv4 after mid-layer and outer
encapsulations, where '*' denotes zero or more additional
encapsulation sublayers. Ingres Tunnel Endpoints (ITEs) add mid-
layer '*' and outer SEAL/*/IPv4 encapsulations to the inner packets
they inject into a subnetwork, where the outermost IPv4 header
contains the source and destination addresses of the subnetwork
entry/exit points (i.e., the ITE/ETE), respectively. SEAL uses a new
Internet Protocol type and a new encapsulation sublayer for both
unicast and multicast. The ITE encapsulates an inner IP packet in
mid-layer and outer encapsulations as shown in Figure 1:

+-------------------------+
| |
~ Outer */IPv4 headers ~
| |
I +-------------------------+
n | SEAL Header |
n +-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
e ~ Any mid-layer * headers ~ ~ Any mid-layer * headers ~
r +-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
| | | |
I --> ~ Inner IP ~ --> ~ Inner IP ~
P --> ~ Packet ~ --> ~ Packet ~
| | | |
P +-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
a ~ Any mid-layer trailers ~ ~ Any mid-layer trailers ~
c +-------------------------+ +-------------------------+
k ~ Any outer trailers ~
e +-------------------------+
t
(After mid-layer encaps.) (After SEAL/*/IPv4 encaps.)

Figure 1: SEAL Encapsulation

where the SEAL header is inserted as follows:

o For simple IPvX/IPv4 encapsulations (e.g.,
[RFC2003][RFC2004][RFC4213]), the SEAL header is inserted between
the inner IP and outer IPv4 headers as: IPvX/SEAL/IPv4.

o For tunnel-mode IPsec encapsulations over IPv4, [RFC4301], the
SEAL header is inserted between the {AH,ESP} header and outer IPv4
headers as: IPvX/*/{AH,ESP}/SEAL/IPv4.

o For IP encapsulations over transports such as UDP, the SEAL header
is inserted immediately after the outer transport layer header,
e.g., as IPvX/*/SEAL/UDP/IPv4.

SEAL-encapsulated packets include a 32-bit SEAL_ID formed from the
concatenation of the 16-bit ID Extension field in the SEAL header as
the most-significant bits, and with the 16-bit Identification value
in the outer IPv4 header as the least-significant bits. (For tunnels
that traverse IPv4 Network Address Translators, the SEAL_ID is
instead maintained only within the 16-bit ID Extension field in the
SEAL header.) Routers within the subnetwork use the SEAL_ID for
duplicate packet detection, and ITEs/ETEs use the SEAL_ID for SEAL
segmentation and reassembly.

SEAL enables a multi-level segmentation and reassembly capability.

First, the ITE can use IPv4 fragmentation to fragment inner IPv4
packets with DF=0 before SEAL encapsulation to avoid lower-level lower-layer
segmentation and reassembly. Secondly, the SEAL layer itself
provides a simple mid-layer cutting-and-pasting of capability for mid-layer
packets to avoid IPv4 fragmentation on the outer packet. Finally,
ordinary IPv4 fragmentation is permitted on the outer packet after
SEAL encapsulation and used to detect and dampen any in-the-network
fragmentation as quickly as possible.

The following sections specifiy specify the SEAL-related operations of the ITE
and ETE, respectively:

4.2. ITE Specification

4.2.1. Tunnel Interface MTU

The ITE configures a tunnel virtual interface over one or more
underlying links that connect the border node to the subnetwork. The
tunnel interface must present a fixed MTU to the inner IP layer
(i.e., Layer 3) as the size for admission of inner IP packets into
the tunnel. Since the tunnel interface may support a potentially
large set of ETEs, however, care must be taken in setting a greatest-
common-denominator MTU for all ETEs while still upholding end system
expectations.

Due to the ubiquitous deployment of standard Ethernet and similar
networking gear, the nominal Internet cell size has become 1500
bytes; this is the de facto size that end systems have come to expect
will either be delivered by the network without loss due to an MTU
restriction on the path or a suitable PTB message returned. However,
the network may not always deliver the necessary PTBs, leading to
MTU-related black holes [RFC2923]. The ITE therefore requires a
means for conveying 1500 byte (or smaller) packets to the ETE without
loss due to MTU restrictions and without dependence on PTB messages
from within the subnetwork.

In common deployments, there may be many forwarding hops between the
original source and the ITE. Within those hops, there may be
additional encapsulations (IPSec, L2TP, etc.) such that a 1500 byte
packet sent by the original source might grow to a larger size by the
time it reaches the ITE for encapsulation as an inner IP packet.
Similarly, additional encapsulations on the path from the ITE to the
ETE could cause the encapsulated packet to become larger still and
trigger in-the-network fragmentation. In order to preserve the end
system expectations, the ITE therefore requires a means for conveying
these larger packets to the ETE even though there may be links within
the subnetwork that configure a smaller MTU.

The ITE should therefore set a tunnel virtual interface MTU of 1500
bytes plus extra room to accommodate any additional encapsulations
that may occur on the path from the original source (i.e., even if
the underlying links do not support an MTU of this size). The ITE
can set larger MTU values still, but should select a value that is
not so large as to cause excessive PTBs coming from within the tunnel
interface (see: (see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.6). The ITE can also set
smaller MTU values, however values; however, care must be taken not to set so small a
value that original sources would experience an MTU underflow. In
particular, IPv6 sources must see a minimum path MTU of 1280 bytes,
and IPv4 sources should see a minimum path MTU of 576 bytes.

The inner IP layer consults the tunnel interface MTU when admitting a
packet into the interface. For inner IPv4 packets larger than the
tunnel interface MTU and with the IPv4 Don't Fragment (DF) bit set to
0, the inner IPv4 layer uses IPv4 fragmentation to break the packet
into fragments no larger than the tunnel interface MTU (but, see also
Section 4.2.3) 4.2.3), then admits each fragment into the tunnel as an
independent packet. For all other inner packets (IPv4 or IPv6), the
ITE admits the packet if it is no larger than the tunnel interface
MTU; otherwise, it drops the packet and sends an ICMP PTB message
with an MTU value of the tunnel interface MTU to the source.

4.2.2. Accounting for Headers

As for any transport layer protocol, ITEs use the MTU of the
underlying IPv4 interface, the length of any mid-layer '*' headers
and trailers, and the length of the outer SEAL/*/IPv4 headers to
determine the maximum-sized upper layer payload. For example, when maximum size for a seal segment (see Section 4.2.3).
For example, when the underlying IPv4 interface advertises an MTU of
1500 bytes and the ITE inserts a minimum-length (i.e., 20 byte) 20-byte) IPv4
header, the ITE sees a maximum payload segment size of 1480 bytes. When the
ITE inserts IPv4 header options, the size is further reduced by as
many as 40 additional bytes (the maximum length for IPv4 options)
such that as few as 1440 bytes may be available for the upper layer upper-layer
payload. When the ITE inserts additional '*' encapsulations, the available MTU for
the upper layer payload
maximum segment size is reduced further still.

The ITE must additionally account for the length of the SEAL header
itself as an extra encapsulation that further reduces the size
available for the upper layer payload. maximum
segment size. The length of the SEAL header is not incorporated in
the IPv4 header length, therefore length; therefore, the network does not observe the
SEAL header as an IPv4 option. In this way, the SEAL header is
inserted after the IPv4 options but before the upper
layer upper-layer payload in
exactly the same manner as for IPv6 extension headers.

4.2.3. Segmentation and Encapsulation

For each ETE, the ITE maintains the length of any mid-layer '*'
encapsulation headers and trailers (e.g., for '*' = AH, ESP, NULL,
etc.) in a variable 'MHLEN' and maintains the length of the outer
SEAL/*/IPv4 encapsulation headers in a variable 'OHLEN'. The ITE
further maintains a variable 'HLEN' set to MHLEN plus OHLEN. The ITE
maintains a SEAL Maximum Reassembly Unit (S_MRU) value for each ETE
as soft state within the tunnel interface (e.g., in the IPv4
destination cache). The ITE initializes S_MRU to a value no larger
than 2KB and uses this value to determine the maximum-sized packet it
will require the ETE to reassemble. The ITE additionally maintains a
SEAL Maximum Segment Size (S_MSS) value for each ETE. The ITE
initializes S_MSS to the maximum of (the underlying IPv4 interface
MTU minus OHLEN) and S_MRU/8 bytes, and decreases or increases S_MSS
based on any ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages received (see: (see
Section 4.2.6).

The ITE performs segmentation and encapsulation on inner packets that
have been admitted into the tunnel interface. For inner IPv4 packets
with the DF bit set to 0, if the length of the inner packet is larger
than (S_MRU - MHLEN) HLEN), the ITE uses IPv4 fragmentation to break the
packet into IPv4 fragments no larger than (S_MRU - MHLEN). HLEN). For
unfragmentable inner packets (e.g., IPv6 packets, IPv4 packets with
DF=1, etc.), if the length of the inner packet is larger than
(MAX(S_MRU, S_MSS) - MHLEN), HLEN), the ITE drops the packet and sends an
ICMP PTB message with an MTU value of (MAX(S_MRU, S_MSS) - MHLEN) HLEN) back
to the original source.

The ITE then encapsulates each inner packet/fragment in the MHLEN
bytes of mid-layer '*' headers and trailers. For each such resulting
mid-layer packet, packet of length 'M', if (S_MRU >= (M + OHLEN) > S_MSS),
the length of ITE must perform SEAL segmentation. To do so, it breaks the
mid-layer packet is no larger
than S_MRU but is larger than S_MSS, the ITE breaks it into N segments (N <= 8) that are no larger than S_MSS
(MIN(1KB, S_MSS) - OHLEN) bytes each. Each
segment segment, except the final one
one, MUST be of equal length, while the final segment MUST be no
larger than the initial segment. The first byte of each segment MUST
begin immediately after the final byte of the previous segment, i.e.,
the segments MUST NOT overlap. The ITE should generate the smallest
number of segments possible, e.g., it should not generate 6 smaller
segments when the packet could be accommodated with 4 larger
segments.

Note that this SEAL segmentation is used only for mid-layer packets
that are no larger than S_MRU; mid-layer packets that are larger than
S_MRU are instead encapsulated as a single segment. Note also that
this SEAL segmentation ignores the fact that the mid-layer
packet may be unfragmentable. This segmentation process is a mid-layer mid-
layer (not an IP layer) operation employed by the ITE to adapt the
mid-layer packet to the subnetwork path characteristics, and the ETE
will restore the packet to its original form during reassembly.
Therefore, the fact that the packet may have been segmented within
the subnetwork is not observable after decapsulation.

The ITE next encapsulates each segment in a SEAL header formatted as
follows:

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ID Extension |A|R|M|RSV| SEG | Next Header |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Figure 2: SEAL Header Format

where the header fields are defined as follows:

ID Extension (16)
a 16-bit extension of the Identification field in the outer IPv4
header; encodes the most-significant 16 bits of a 32 bit SEAL_ID
value.

A (1)
the "Acknowledgement Requested" bit. Set to 1 if the ITE wishes
to receive an explicit acknowledgement from the ETE.

R (1)
the "Report Fragmentation" bit. Set to 1 if the ITE wishes to
receive a report from the ETE if any IPv4 fragmentation occurs.

M (1)
the "More Segments" bit. Set to 1 if this SEAL protocol packet
contains a non-final segment of a multi-segment mid-layer packet.

RSV (2)
a 2-bit field reserved for future use. Must be set to 0 for the
purpose of this specification.

SEG (3)
a 3-bit Segment segment number. Encodes a segment number between 0 - 7.

Next Header (8)
an 8-bit field that encodes an Internet Protocol number the same
as for the IPv4 protocol and IPv6 next header fields.

For single-segment mid-layer packets, the ITE encapsulates the
segment in a SEAL header with (M=0; Segment=0). SEG=0). For N-segment mid- layer
packets (N <= 8), the ITE encapsulates each segment in a SEAL header
with (M=1; Segment=0) SEG=0) for the first segment, (M=1; Segment=1) SEG=1) for the second
segment, etc., with the final segment setting (M=0;
Segment=N-1). SEG=N-1).

The ITE next sets RSV='00' and sets the A and R bits in the SEAL
header of the first segment according to whether the packet is to be
used as an explicit/implicit probe as specified in Section 4.2.4.
The ITE then writes the Internet Protocol number corresponding to the
mid-layer packet in the SEAL 'Next Header' field and encapsulates
each segment in the requisite */IPv4 outer headers according to the
specific encapsulation format (e.g., [RFC2003], [RFC4213], [RFC4380],
etc.), except that it writes 'SEAL_PROTO' in the protocol field of
the outer IPv4 header (when simple IPv4 encapsualtion is used) or
writes 'SEAL_PORT' in the outer destination service port field (e.g.,
when UDP/IPv4 encapsulation is used). The ITE finally sets packet
identification values as specified in Section 4.2.5 and sends the
packets as specified in Section 4.2.6.

4.2.4. Sending Probes

When S_MSS is larger than S_MRU/8 bytes, the ITE sends ordinary
encapsulated data packets as implicit probes to detect in-the-network
IPv4 fragmentation and to determine new values for S_MSS. The ITE
sets R=1 in the SEAL header of the first segment of a SEAL-segmented packet with SEG=0 to be used as an
implicit probe, and will receive ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages
from the ETE if any IPv4 fragmentation occurs. When the ITE has
already reduced S_MSS to the minimum value, it instead sets R=0 in
the SEAL header to avoid generating fragmentation reports for
unavoidable in-the-network fragmentation.

The ITE should send explicit probes periodically to manage a window
of SEAL_IDs of outstanding probes as a means to validate any ICMPv4
messages it receives. The ITE sets A=1 in the SEAL header of the
first segment of a SEAL-segmented
packet with SEG=0 to be used as an explicit probe, where the probe
can be either an ordinary data packet or a NULL packet created by
setting the 'Next Header' field in the SEAL header to a value of "No
Next Header" (see: [RFC2460], (see Section 4.7). 4.7 of [RFC2460]).

The ITE should further send explicit probes periodically probes, periodically, to detect
increases in S_MSS by resetting S_MSS to the maximum of (the
underlying IPv4 interface MTU minus OHLEN) and S_MRU/8 bytes, and/or
sending explicit probes that are larger than the current S_MSS.

4.2.5. Packet Identification

For the purpose of packet identification, the ITE maintains a 32-bit
SEAL_ID value as per-ETE soft state, e.g. e.g., in the IPv4 destination
cache. The ITE randomly-initializes randomly initializes SEAL_ID when the soft state is
created and monotonically increments it (modulo 2^32) for each
successive SEAL protocol packet it sends to the ETE. For each
packet, the ITE writes the least-significant 16 bits of the SEAL_ID
value in the Identification field in the outer IPv4 header, and
writes the most-significant 16 bits in the ID Extension field in the
SEAL header.

For SEAL encapsulations specifically designed for the traversal of
IPv4 Network Address Translators (NATs), e.g., for encapsulations
that insert a UDP header between the SEAL header and outer IPv4
header such as IPv6/SEAL/UDP/IPv4, the ITE instead maintains SEAL_ID
as a 16-bit value that it randomly-initializes randomly initializes when the soft state is
created and monotonically increments (modulo 2^16) for each
successive packet. For each packet, the ITE writes SEAL_ID in the ID
extension field of the SEAL header and writes a random 16-bit value
in the Identification field in the outer IPv4 header. This is due to
the fact that the ITE has no way to control IPv4 NATs in the path
that coud rewrite the Identification value in the outer IPv4 header.

4.2.6. Sending SEAL Protocol Packets

Following SEAL segmentation and encapsulation, the ITE sets DF=0 in
the outer IPv4 header of every outer packet it sends. For
"expendable" packets (e.g., for NULL packets used as probes - see: -- see
Section 4.2.4), the ITE may optionally instead set DF=1.

The ITE then sends each outer packet that encapsulates a segment of
the same mid-layer packet into the tunnel in canonical order, i.e.,
Segment
segment 0 first, followed by Segment segment 1, etc. and finally Segment segment N-1.

4.2.7. Processing Raw ICMPv4 Messages

The ITE may receive "raw" ICMPv4 error messages from either the ETE
or routers within the subnetwork that comprise an outer IPv4 header header,
followed by an ICMPv4 header header, followed by a portion of the SEAL
packet that generated the error (also known as the "packet-in-error"). "packet-in-
error"). For such messages, the ITE can use the 32-bit SEAL ID
encoded in the packet-in-error as a nonce to confirm that the ICMP
message came from either the ETE or an on-path router. The ITE MAY
process raw ICMPv4 messages as soft errors indicating that the path
to the ETE may be failing, but it discards any raw ICMPv4
Fragmentation Needed messages for which the IPv4 header of the
packet-in-error has DF=0.

The ITE should specifically process raw ICMPv4 Protocol Unreachable
messages as a hint that the ETE does not implement the SEAL protocol.

4.2.8. Processing SEAL-Encapsulated ICMPv4 Messages

In addition to any raw ICMPv4 messages, the ITE may receive SEAL-
encapsulated ICMPv4 messages from the ETE that comprise outer ICMPv4/
*/SEAL/*/IPv4 headers followed by a portion of the SEAL-encapsulated
packet-in-error. The ITE can use the 32-bit SEAL ID encoded in the
packet-in-error as well as information in the outer IPv4 and SEAL
headers as nonces to confirm that the ICMP message came from a
legitimate ETE. The ITE then verifies that the SEAL_ID encoded in
the packet-in-error is within the current window of transmitted
SEAL_IDs for this ETE. If the SEAL_ID is outside of the window, the
ITE discards the message; otherwise, it advances the window and
processes the message.

The ITE processes SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 messages other than ICMPv4
Fragmentation Needed exactly as specified in [RFC0792].

For SEAL-
encapsulated SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages, if the ITE
sets a variable 'L' to the IPv4 length of the packet-in-error minus OHLEN is larger than S_MSS the ITE sets
S_MSS to this new value. Otherwise,
OHLEN. If (L > S_MSS), or if the packet-in-error is an IPv4 first-fragment first-
fragment (i.e., with MF=1; Offset=0) the ITE sets S_MSS to
this new value if the value is no smaller than (576 - OHLEN) and sets
S_MSS to MAX(S_MSS/2, S_MRU/8) if the value is smaller than (L >= (576 -
OHLEN). OHLEN)), the
ITE sets (S_MSS = L).

Note that 576 in the above, 576 accounts for above corresponds to the nominal minimum MTU for
common
IPv4 links. When an ETE returns ITE instead receives an IPv4 first-fragment
packet-in-error with length smaller than 576, (L < (576 - OHLEN)), it discovers that IPv4
fragmentation is occurring in the network but it cannot determine the
true MTU of the restricting link. The ITE performs should therefore search
for a
"limited halving" of reduced S_MSS to account for IPv4 links with unusually
small MTUs or cases in which the ETE otherwise receives value (to a minimum of S_MRU/8) through an undersized
IPv4 first-fragment.
iterative searching strategy that parallels (Section 5 of [RFC1191]).

This limited halving searching strategy may require multiple iterations of sending probes
SEAL packets with DF=0 using a reduced S_MSS and receiving ICMPv4 additional
Fragmentation Needed messages, but it will soon converge to a stable S_MSS
value.
When performing During this limited having, process, it is important essential that the ITE
adjust its reduce
S_MSS size based on the first ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed message received, and
refrain from further reducing S_MSS until ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed
messages pertaining to packets sent under the new S_MSS are received. For example,

As an optimization only, the ITE should not repeatedly halve the S_MSS
based on a burst of ICMPv4 MAY transcribe SEAL-encapsulated
Fragmentation Needed messages all
pertaining that contain sufficient information
into corresponding PTB messages to return to packets sent under the same S_MSS. original source.

4.3. ETE Specification

4.3.1. Reassembly Buffer Requirements

ETEs MUST be capable of using IPv4-layer reassembly to reassemble
SEAL protocol outer IPv4 packets of (2KB + OHELN) up to 2KB in length, and MUST also
be capable of using SEAL-layer reassembly to reassemble mid-layer
packets of up to (2KB + - OHLEN). The term OHLEN is included to account for Note that the length of ITE must retain the
SEAL/*/IPv4 header, which must be retained header during both IPv4-layer and SEAL-layer reassembly
for the purpose of associating the fragments/segments of the same
packet. (Note that the term S_MRU used in section 4.2 omits
OHLEN for the purpose of specification clarity).

4.3.2. IPv4-Layer Reassembly

The ETE performs IPv4 reassembly as-normal, as normal, and should maintain a
conservative high- and low-water mark for the number of outstanding
reassemblies pending for each ITE. When the size of the reassembly
buffer exceeds this high-water mark, the ETE actively discards
incomplete reassemblies (e.g., using an Active Queue Management (AQM)
strategy) until the size falls below the low-water mark. The ETE
should also use a reduced IPv4 maximum segment lifetime value (e.g.,
15 seconds), i.e., the time after which it will discard an incomplete
IPv4 reassembly for a SEAL protocol packet. SEAL protocol packet. Finally, the ETE should
also actively discard any pending reassemblies that clearly have no
opportunity for completion, e.g., when a considerable number of new
IPv4 fragments have been received before a fragment that completes a
pending reassembly has arrived.

After reassembly, the ETE either accepts or discards the reassembled
packet based on the current status of the IPv4 reassembly cache
(congested vs versus uncongested). The SEAL_ID included in the IPv4
first- fragment provides an additional level of reassembly assurance,
since it can record a distinct arrival timestamp useful for
associating the first-fragment with its corresponding non-initial
fragments. The choice of accepting/discarding a reassembly may also
depend on the strength of the upper-layer integrity check if known
(e.g., IPSec/ESP provides a strong upper-layer integrity check)
and/or the corruption tolerance of the data (e.g., multicast
streaming audio/video may be more corruption-tolerant than file
transfer, etc.). In the limiting case, the ETE may choose to discard
all IPv4 reassemblies and process only the IPv4 first-fragment for
SEAL-encapsulated error generation purposes (see the following
sections).

4.3.3. Generating SEAL-Encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed
Messages

During IPv4-layer reassembly, the ETE determines whether the packet
belongs to the SEAL protocol by checking for SEAL_PROTO in the outer
IPv4 header (i.e., for simple IPv4 encapsulation) or for SEAL_PORT in
the outer */IPv4 header (e.g., for '*'=UDP). When the ETE processes
the IPv4 first-fragment (i.e, one with DF=1 and Offset =0 Offset=0 in the IPv4
header) of a SEAL protocol IPv4 packet with (R=1; Segment=0) SEG=0) in the SEAL
header, it sends a SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed
message back to the ITE with the MTU field set to 0. (Note that
setting a non-zero value in the MTU field of the ICMPv4 Fragmentation
Needed message would be redundant with the length value in the IPv4
header of the first fragment, since this value is set to the correct
path MTU through in-the-network fragmentation. Setting the MTU field
to 0 therefore avoids the ambiguous case in which the MTU field and
the IPv4 length field of the first fragment first-fragment would record different
non-zero values.)

When the ETE processes a SEAL protocol IPv4 packet with (A=1;
Segment=0) SEG=0)
for which no IPv4 reassembly was required, or for which IPv4
reassembly was successful and the R bit was not set, it sends a
SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed message back to the ITE
with the MTU value set to 0. Note therefore that when both the A and
R bits are set and fragmentation occurs, the ETE only sends a single
ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed message, i.e., it does not send two
separate messages (one for the first fragment first-fragment and a second for the
reassembled whole SEAL packet).

The ETE prepares the ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed message by
encapsulating as much of the first fragment first-fragment (or the whole IPv4 the non-
fragmented packet) as possible in outer */SEAL/*/IPv4 headers without
the length of the message exceeding 576 bytes bytes, as shown in Figure 3:

+-------------------------+ -
| | \
~ Outer */SEAL/*/IPv4 hdrs~ |
| | |
+-------------------------+ |
| ICMPv4 Header | |
|(Dest Unreach; Frag Need)| |
+-------------------------+ |
| | > Up to 576 bytes
~ IP/*/SEAL/*/IPv4 ~ |
~ hdrs of packet/fragment ~ |
| | |
+-------------------------+ |
| | |
~ Data of packet/fragment ~ |
| | /
+-------------------------+ -

Figure 3: SEAL-encapsulated SEAL-Encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed Message

The ETE next sets A=0, R=0 and Segment=0 in the outer SEAL header,

sets the SEAL_ID the same as for any SEAL packet, then sets the SEAL
Next Header field and the fields of the outer */IPv4 headers the same
as for ordinay ordinary SEAL encapsulation. The ETE then sets the outer IPv4
destination address to the source address of the first-fragment and
sets the outer IPv4 source address to the destination address of the
first-fragment.
packet/fragment. If the destination address in the first-fragment packet/fragment
was multicast, the ETE instead sets the outer IPv4 source address to
an address assigned to the underlying IPv4 interface. The ETE
finally sends the SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 message to the ITE the
same as specified in Section 4.2.5, except that when the A bit in the packet-
in-error
packet/fragment is not set set, the ETE sends the messages subject to
rate limiting since it is not entirely critical that all
fragmentation be reported to the ITE.

4.3.4. SEAL-Layer Reassembly

Following IPv4 reassembly, for reassembly of a SEAL packets packet with (M=1; Segment=0) in (RSV!=0; SEG=0), if
the SEAL header (other than packet is not a SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 messages), message the ETE discards the packet and sends
generates a SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 Parameter Problem message with
pointer set to the flags field in the SEAL header and sends it back
to the ITE subject to rate limiting exactly as for
SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages (see: in the same manner specified in Section
4.3.3). 4.3.3; the ITE
then drops the packet. For all other SEAL packets, the ETE adds the
packet to a SEAL-Layer pending-reassembly queue if either the M bit
or the
Segment SEG field in the SEAL header is non-zero.

The ETE performs SEAL-layer reassembly through simple in-order
concatenation of the encapsulated segments from N consecutive SEAL
protocol packets from the same mid-layer packet. SEAL-layer
reassembly requires the ETE to maintain a cache of recently received
segments for a hold time that would allow for reasonable inter-
segment delays. The ETE uses a SEAL maximum segment lifetime of 15
seconds for this purpose, i.e., the time after which it will discard
an incomplete reassembly. However, the ETE should also actively
discard any pending reassemblies that clearly have no opportunity for
completion, e.g., when a considerable number of new SEAL packets have
been received before a packet that completes a pending reassembly has
arrived.

The ETE reassembles the mid-layer packet segments in SEAL protocol
packets that contain Segment segment numbers 0 through N-1, with M=1/0 in
non-final/final segments, respectively, and with consecutive SEAL_ID
values. That is, for an N-segment mid-layer packet, reassembly
entails the concatenation of the SEAL-encapsulated segments with
(Segment
(segment 0, SEAL_ID i), followed by (Segment (segment 1, SEAL_ID ((i + 1) mod
2^32)), etc. up to (Segment (segment N-1, SEAL_ID ((i + N-1) mod 2^32)). (For
SEAL encapsulations specifically designed for traversal of IPv4 NATs,
the ETE instead uses only a 16-bit SEAL_ID value, and uses mod 2^16
arithmetic to associate the segments of the same packet.)

4.3.5. Delivering Packets to Upper Layers

Following SEAL-layer reassembly, the ETE silently discards the
reassembled packet if it was a NULL packet (see: (see Section 4.2.4). In
the same manner, the ETE silently discards any reassembled mid-layer
packet larger than 2KB (2KB - OHLEN) that either experienced IPv4
fragmentation or did not arrive as a single SEAL segment.

Next, if the ETE determines that the inner packet cannot be processed
further it prepares would cause an appropriate SEAL-encapsulated
ICMPv4 error message (if the inner packet itself was not an ICMP message), sends
the to be generated, it generates a SEAL-
encapsulated ICMPv4 error message and sends it back to the ITE subject to rate limiting and in the
same manner specified in Section 4.3.3; the ITE then either accepts
or drops the packet. packet according to the type of error. Otherwise, the
ETE delivers the inner packet to the
upper layer upper-layer protocol indicated
in the Next Header field.

5. SEAL Protocol Specification - Transport Mode

Section 4 specifies the operation of SEAL in "tunnel mode", i.e.,
when there is are both an inner and outer IP layer and with a SEAL
encapsulation layer between. However, the SEAL protocol can also be
used in a "transport mode" of operation within a subnetwork region in
which the inner layer inner-layer corresponds to a transport layer protocol
(e.g., UDP, TCP, etc.) instead of an inner IP layer.

For example, two TCP endpoints connected to the same subnetwork
region can negotiate the use of transport-mode SEAL for a connection
by inserting a 'SEAL_OPTION' TCP option during the connection
establishment phase. If both TCPs agree on the use of SEAL, their
protocol messages will be carriaged carried as TCP/SEAL/IPv4 and the connection
will be serviced by the SEAL protocol using TCP (nstead (instead of an
encapsulating tunnel endpoint) as the transport layer protocol. The
SEAL protocol for transport mode otherwise observes the same
specifications as for Section 4.

6. Link Requirements

Subnetwork designers are strongly encouraged to follow the
recommendations in [RFC3819] when configuring link MTUs, where all
IPv4 links SHOULD configure a minimum MTU of 576 bytes. Links that
cannot configure an MTU of at least 576 bytes (e.g., due to
performance characteristics) SHOULD implement transparent link-layer
segmentation and reassembly such that an MTU of at least 576 can
still be presented to the IPv4 layer.

In the case that a fast IPv4 link within the subnetwork configures an
unusually small MTU, the ITE can sense this smaller value through
implicit probing and should reduce S_MRU to a size smaller than 2KB
that would minimize SEAL segmentation and IPv4 fragmentation.
However, the ITE must take care not to reduce S_MRU to such small a small
value that original sources would experience an MTU underflow and
hence an unusable path. (For example, IPv6 sources must see a
minimum path MTU of 1280 bytes.)

7. End System Requirements

SEAL provides robust mechanisms for returning PTB messages to the
original source, however messages; however,
end systems that send unfragmentable IP packets larger than 1500
bytes are strongly encouraged to use Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery per [RFC4821].

8. Router Requirements

IPv4 routers within the subnetwork are strongly encouraged to
implement IPv4 fragmentation such that the first fragment first-fragment is the
largest and approximately the size of the underlying link MTU.

9. IANA Considerations

SEAL_PROTO, SEAL_PORT SEAL_PORT, and SEAL_OPTION are taken from their
respective range of experimental values documented in [RFC3692][RFC4727]. [RFC3692] and
[RFC4727]. These values are for experimentation purposes only, and
not to be used for any kind of deployments (i.e., they are not to be
shipped in any products). This document therefore has no actions for IANA.

10. Security Considerations

Unlike IPv4 fragmentation, overlapping fragment attacks are not
possible due to the requirement that SEAL segments be non-
overlapping.

An amplification/reflection attack is possible when an attacker sends
IPv4 first-fragments with spoofed source addresses to an ETE,
resulting in a stream of ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages
returned to a victim ITE. The encapsulated segment of the spoofed
IPv4 first-fragment provides mitigation for the ITE to detect and
discard spurious ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages.

The SEAL header is sent in-the-clear (outside of any IPsec/ESP
encapsulations) the same as for the IPv4 header. outer */IPv4 headers. As for
IPv6 extension headers, the SEAL header is protected only by L2
integrity checks and is not covered under any L3 integrity checks.

11. Related Work

Section 3.1.7 of [RFC2764] provides a high-level sketch for
supporting large tunnel MTUs via a tunnel-level segmentation and
reassembly capability to avoid IP level fragmentation, which is in
part the same approach used by tunnel-mode SEAL. SEAL could
therefore be considered as a fully-functioned fully functioned manifestation of the
method postulated by that informational reference, however reference; however, SEAL also
supports other modes of operation including transport-mode and
duplicate packet detection.

Section 3 of[RFC4459] of [RFC4459] describes inner and outer fragmentation at the
tunnel endpoints as alternatives for accommodating the tunnel MTU,
however MTU;
however, the SEAL protocol specifies a mid-layer segmentation and
reassembly capability that is distinct from both inner and outer
fragmentation.

Section 4 of [RFC2460] specifies a method for inserting and
processing extension headers between the base IPv6 header and
transport layer protocol data. The SEAL header is in fact inserted and
processed in exactly the same manner.

The concepts of path MTU determination through the report of
fragmentation and extending the IP Identification field were first
proposed in deliberations of the TCP-IP mailing list and the Path MTU
Discovery Working Group (MTUDWG) during the late 1980's and early
1990's. SEAL supports a report fragmentation capability using bits
in an extension header (the original proposal used a spare bit in the
IP header) and supports ID extension through a 16 bit 16-bit field in an
extension header (the original proposal used a new IP option). An A
historical analysis of the evolution of these concepts concepts, as well as
the development of the eventual path MTU discovery mechanism for IP IP,
appears in Appendix A of this document.

12. SEAL Advantages over Classical Methods

The SEAL approach offers a number of distinct advantages over the
classical path MTU discovery methods[RFC1191] methods [RFC1191] [RFC1981]:

1. Classical path MTU discovery *always* results in packet loss when
an MTU restriction is encountered. Using SEAL, IPv4
fragmentation provides a short-term interim mechanism for
ensuring that packets are delivered while SEAL adjusts its packet
sizing parameters.

2. Classical path MTU discovery requires that routers generate an
ICMP PTB message for *all* packets lost due to an MTU
restriction; this situation is exacerbated at high data rates and
becomes severe for in-the-network tunnels that service many
communicating end systems. Since SEAL ensures that packets no
larger than S_MRU are delivered, however, it is sufficient for
the ETE to return ICMPv4 Fragmentation Needed messages subject to
rate limiting and not for every packet-in-error.

3. Classical path MTU may require several iterations of dropping
packets and returning ICMP PTB messasges until an acceptable path
MTU value is determined. Under normal circumstances, SEAL
determines the correct packet sizing parameters in a single
iteration.

4. Using SEAL, ordinary packets serve as implicit probes without
exposing data to unnecessary loss. SEAL also provides an
explicit probing mode not available in the classic methods.

5. Using SEAL, ICMP error messages are encapsulated in an outer SEAL
header such that packet-filtering network middleboxes can
distinguish them from "raw" ICMP messages that may be generated
by an attacker.

6. Most importantly, all SEAL packets have a 32 bit 32-bit Identification
value that can be used for duplicate packet detection purposes
and to match ICMP error messages with actual packets sent without
requiring per-packet state. Moreover, the SEAL ITE can be
configured to accept ICMP feedback only from the legitimate ETE,
hence ETE;
hence, the packet spoofing-related denial of service denial-of-service attack
vectors open to the classical methods are eliminated.

In summary, the SEAL approach represents an architecturally superior
method for ensuring that packets of various sizes are either
delivered or deterministically dropped. When end systems use their
own end-to-end MTU determination mechanisms [RFC4821], the SEAL
advantages are further enhanced.

13. Acknowledgments

The following individuals are acknowledged for helpful comments and
suggestions: Jari Arkko, Fred Baker, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Teco Boot,
Bob Braden, Brian Carpenter, Steve Casner, Ian Chakeres, Remi Denis-
Courmont, Aurnaud Ebalard, Gorry Fairhurst, Joel Halpern, John
Heffner, Thomas Henderson, Bob Hinden, Christian Huitema, Joe Macker,
Matt Mathis, Dan Romascanu, Dave Thaler, Joe Touch, Magnus
Westerlund, Robin Whittle, James Woodyatt Woodyatt, and members of the Boeing
PhantomWorks DC&NT group.

Path MTU determination through the report of fragmentation was first
proposed by Charles Lynn on the TCP-IP mailing list in 1987.
Extending the IP identification field was first proposed by Steve
Deering on the MTUDWG mailing list in 1989.

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, September
1981.

[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, September 1981.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

14.2. Informative References

[FOLK] C, C., D, D., and k. k, "Beyond Folklore: Observations on
Fragmented Traffic", December 2002.

[FRAG] Kent, C. and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered Harmful",
October 1987.

[MTUDWG] "IETF MTU Discovery Working Group mailing list,
gatekeeper.dec.com/pub/DEC/WRL/mogul/mtudwg-log, November
1989 - February 1995.".

[RFC1063] Mogul, J., Kent, C., Partridge, C., and K. McCloghrie, "IP
MTU discovery options", RFC 1063, July 1988.

[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
November 1990.

[RFC1981] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 1981, August 1996.

[RFC2003] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003,
October 1996.

[RFC2004] Perkins, C., "Minimal Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2004,
October 1996.

[RFC2764] Gleeson, B., Heinanen, J., Lin, A., Heinanen, J., Armitage, G., and A.
Malis, "A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private
Networks", RFC 2764, February 2000.

[RFC2923] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery", RFC
2923, September 2000.

[RFC3692] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.

[RFC3819] Karn, P., Ed., Bormann, C., Fairhurst, G., Grossman, D.,
Ludwig, R., Mahdavi, J., Montenegro, G., Touch, J., and L.
Wood, "Advice for Internet Subnetwork Designers", BCP 89,
RFC 3819, July 2004.

[RFC4213] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms
for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", RFC 4213, October 2005.

[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

[RFC4380] Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380, February
2006.

[RFC4459] Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-
Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, April 2006.

[RFC4727] Fenner, B., "Experimental Values In IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4,
ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP Headers", RFC 4727, November 2006.

[RFC4821] Mathis, M. Gellens, R., Singer, D., and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", P. Frojdh, "The Codecs
Parameter for "Bucket" Media Types", RFC 4821, March 2007. 4281, November
2005.

[RFC4963] Heffner, J., Mathis, M., and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly
Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963, July 2007.

[TCP-IP] "TCP-IP mailing list archives,
http://www-mice.cs.ucl.ac.uk/multimedia/mist/tcpip, May
1987 - May 1990.".

Appendix A. Historic Evolution of PMTUD

(Taken from 'draft-templin-v6v4-ndisc-01.txt'; "Neighbor Affiliation Protocol for IPv6-over-(foo)-over-
IPv4"; written 10/30/2002):

The topic of Path MTU discovery (PMTUD) saw a flurry of discussion
and numerous proposals in the late 1980's through early 1990. The
initial problem was posed by Art Berggreen on May 22, 1987 in a
message to the TCP-IP discussion group [TCP-IP]. The discussion that
followed provided significant reference material for [FRAG]. An IETF
Path MTU Discovery Working Group [MTUDWG] was formed in late 1989
with charter to produce an RFC. Several variations on a very few
basic proposals were entertained, including:

1. Routers record the PMTUD estimate in ICMP-like path probe
messages (proposed in [FRAG] and later [RFC1063])

2. The destination reports any fragmentation that occurs for packets
received with the "RF" (Report Fragmentation) bit set (Steve
Deering's 1989 adaptation of Charles Lynn's Nov. 1987 proposal)

3. A hybrid combination of 1) and Charles Lynn's Nov. 1987 proposal (straw
RFC draft by McCloughrie, Fox and Mogul on Jan 12, 1990)

4. Combination of the Lynn proposal with TCP (Fred Bohle, Jan 30,
1990)

5. Fragmentation avoidance by setting "IP_DF" flag on all packets
and retransmitting if ICMPv4 "fragmentation needed" messages
occur (Geof Cooper's 1987 proposal; later adapted into [RFC1191]
by Mogul and Deering).

Option 1) seemed attractive to the group at the time, since it was
believed that routers would migrate more quickly than hosts. Option
2) was a strong contender, but repeated attempts to secure an "RF"
bit in the IPv4 header from the IESG failed and the proponents became
discouraged. 3) was abandoned because it was perceived as too
complicated, and 4) never received any apparent serious
consideration. Proposal 5) was a late entry into the discussion from
Steve Deering on Feb. 24th, 1990. The discussion group soon
thereafter seemingly lost track of all other proposals and adopted
5), which eventually evolved into [RFC1191] and later [RFC1981].

In retrospect, the "RF" bit postulated in 2) is not needed if a
"contract" is first established between the peers, as in proposal 4)
and a message to the MTUDWG mailing list from jrd@PTT.LCS.MIT.EDU on
Feb 19. 1990. These proposals saw little discussion or rebuttal, and
were dismissed based on the following the assertions:

o routers upgrade their software faster than hosts

o PCs could not reassemble fragmented packets

o Proteon and Wellfleet routers did not reproduce the "RF" bit
properly in fragmented packets

o Ethernet-FDDI bridges would need to perform fragmentation (i.e.,
"translucent" not "transparent" bridging)

o the 16-bit IP_ID field could wrap around and disrupt reassembly at
high packet arrival rates

The first four assertions, although perhaps valid at the time, have
been overcome by historical events leaving only the final to
consider. But, [FOLK] has shown that IP_ID wraparound simply does
not occur within several orders of magnitude the reassembly timeout
window on high-bandwidth networks.

(Authors 2/11/08 note: this final point was based on a loose
interpretation of [FOLK], and is more accurately addressed in
[RFC4963].)

Appendix B. Reliability Extensions

The SEAL header includes a Reserved (RSV) field that is set to zero
for the purpose of this specification. This field may be used by
future updates to this specification for the purpose of improved
reliability in the face of loss due to congestion, singal signal
intermittence, etc. Automatic Repeat-ReQuest (ARQ) mechanisms are
used to ensure relaible reliable delivery between the endpoints of physical
links (e.g., on-link neighbors in an IEEE 802.11 network) as well as
between the endpoints of an end-to-end transport (e.g., the endpoints
of a TCP connection). However, ARQ mechanisms are may be poorly suited
to in-the-network elements such as the SEAL ITE and ETE, since
retransmission of lost segments would require unacceptable state
maintenance at the ITE and would result in packet reordering within
the subnetwork.

Instead, alternate reliability mechanisms such as Forward Error
Correction (FEC) may be specified in future updates to this
specification for the purpose of improved reliability. Such
mechanisms may entail the ITE performing proactive transmissions of
redundant data, e.g., by sending multiple copies of the same data.
Signaling from the ETE (e.g., by sending SEAL-encapsulated ICMPv4
Source Quench messages) may be specified in a future document as a
means for the ETE to dynamically update the ITE of changing FEC
conditions.

Author's Address

Fred L. Templin (editor) Templin, Editor
Boeing Phantom Works
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA 98124
USA

Email:

EMail: fltemplin@acm.org

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